The issue of security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and design of cyber-physical systems.
surveillance and distributed computing; see for instance [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . On the other hand, self-triggered coordination turns out to be of major interest when consensus has to be achieved in spite of possibly severe communication constraints. In this respect, a remarkable feature of self-triggered coordination lies in the possibility of ensuring consensus properties in the absence of any global information on the graph topology and with no need to synchronize the agents local clocks.
A basic question in the analysis of distributed coordination in the presence of DoS is concerned with the modeling of DoS attacks. In this paper, no assumption is made regarding the DoS attack underlying strategy. We consider a general attack model that only constrains the attacker action in time by posing limitations on the frequency of DoS attacks and their duration. This makes it possible to capture many different types of DoS attacks, including trivial, periodic, random and protocol-aware jamming attacks [19] [20] [21] [22] . One contribution of this paper is an explicit characterization of the frequency and duration of DoS attacks under which consensus properties can be preserved. The result is intuitive as it relates consensus with the ratio between the on/off periods of jamming.
The analysis taken here reminds of stability problems for switching systems. More specifically, since DoS generates communications failures, the problem is naturally casted as a consensus problem for switching topology networks. This problem is certainly not new in the literature. For instance, [15] shows that agreement can be reached whenever the graph connectivity is preserved point-wise in time; [17] suggests a Persistency of Excitation (PoE) condition, which stipulates that graph connectivity should be established over a period of time, rather than point-wise in time, which is similar to the joint connectivity assumption in [16] . In CPSs, however, the situation turns out to be drastically different. In fact, one needs to deal with the fact that networked communication is inherently digital, which means that the rate at which the transmissions are scheduled cannot be arbitrarily large. Under such circumstances, the aforementioned tools turn out be ineffective.
In order to cope with this situation, we introduce a notion of Persistency of Communication (PoC). This notion naturally extends the PoE condition to a digital networked setting by requiring that the graph connectivity be established over periods of time that are consistent with the constraints imposed by the communication medium. A characterization of DoS frequency and duration under which consensus properties can be preserved is then obtained by exploiting the PoC condition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate the control problem along with a characterization of the considered class of DoS signals. The main results in Section III. A numerical example is given in Section IV. Finally, Section V ends the paper with concluding remarks.
Notation. The notation adopted in this paper is in the main standard. We denote by R, R >0 , R ≥0 the sets of real, positive, and nonnegative numbers, respectively. Also, we denote by Z ≥0 the set of nonnegative integers.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. Distributed Control System
We assume to have a set of nodes I = {1, . . . , n} representing our agents and an undirected connected graph G = (I, E) with E a set of unordered pairs of nodes, called edges. We denote by D and L the Incidence and Laplacian matrix of G, respectively, where the latter is a symmetric matrix. For each node i ∈ I, we denote by N i the set of its neighbors, and by d i its degree, that is, the cardinality of N i .
We consider the following hybrid dynamics on a triplet of n-dimensional variables involving the consensus variable x, the controls u, and the local clock variables θ. All these variables are defined for time t ≥ 0. Controls are assumed to belong to {−1, 0, +1}. The specific quantizer of choice is sign ε : R → {−1, 0, +1}, defined according to
where ε > 0 is a sensitivity parameter, which can be used at the design stage for trading-off frequency of the control updates vs. accuracy of the consensus region.
The system (x, u, θ) ∈ R 3n in the nominal operating mode, i.e., in the absence of DoS, satisfies the following continuous evolution
except for every t such that the set S(θ, t) = {i ∈ I : θ i = 0} is non-empty. At such time instants, the system satisfies the following discrete evolution
where for every i ∈ I the map f i : R n → R >0 is defined by
where, for conciseness, we have defined
Self-triggered coordination algorithms such as (2)- (4) . turn out to be of major interest when consensus has to be achieved in spite of possibly severe communication constraints. In this respect, a remarkable feature of self-triggered coordination lies in the possibility of ensuring consensus properties in the absence of any global information on the graph topology and with no need to synchronize the agents local clocks [14] .
The result which follows characterizes the convergence properties of (2)-(4) in the nominal operating mode, and will serve as a basis for the developments of the paper.
Theorem 1: [14] . Given anyx ∈ R n , let x(t) be the solution to (2)-(4) with x(0) =x. Then x(t) converges in finite time to a point x * ∈ R n belonging to the set
B. Denial-of-Service
We shall refer to DoS as the phenomenon by which communication across the network is not possible. More specifically, we assume that the network nodes make use of a shared communication medium. Under DoS, none of the network nodes can send or receive information. This scenario is representative of several possible DoS threats. In order to maintain continuity, a discussion on this point is deferred to Section II-C. Here, we proceed with the DoS modeling and introduce a number of assumption on its frequency and duration.
Let {h n } n∈Z ≥0 , where h 0 ≥ 0, denote the sequence of DoS off/on transitions, i.e., the time instants at which DoS exhibits a transition from zero (communication is possible) to one (communication is interrupted). Then
represents the n-th DoS time-interval, of a length τ n ∈ R >0 , over which communication is not possible. Here and in the sequel, it is understood that h n+1 > h n +τ n for all n ∈ Z ≥0 , otherwise H n ∪ H n+1 could be regarded as a single DoS interval.
represent the sets of time instants where communication is denied and
represent the sets of time instants where communication is allowed, where \ denote the relative complement.
In connection with the definition of the DoS sequence in (7) , the first question to be addressed is that of determining the amount of DoS that the network can tolerate before consensus, as defined in Theorem 1, is lost. In this respect, it is simple to see that such an amount is not arbitrary, and that suitable conditions must be imposed on both DoS frequency and duration.
Let us first consider the frequency at which DoS can occur. First notice that ε/4d i provides a lower bound on the intersampling rate of the i-th node of the network, as imposed by the communication medium. Let now Λ n = h n+1 − h n , with n ∈ Z ≥0 , denote the time elapsing between any two successive DoS triggering. By letting d min = min i∈I d i , one immediately sees that if Λ n ≤ ∆ * := ε 4d min then consensus could be destroyed irrespective of the adopted communication strategy. This is because DoS would be allowed to occur at a rate faster than or equal to the sampling rate of some network node, which would clearly preclude the possibility to achieve consensus. It is intuitively clear that, in order to get stability, the frequency at which DoS can occur must be sufficiently small compared to sampling rate of the network nodes. A natural way to express this requirement is via the concept of average dwell-time, as introduced by [23] .
for all t, τ ∈ R ≥0 and t ≥ τ . In addition to the DoS frequency, one also need to enforce constraints on the DoS duration, namely the length of the intervals over which communication is interrupted. To see this, consider for example a DoS sequence consisting of the singleton {h 0 }. Assumption 1 is clearly satisfied with η ≥ 1. However, if H 0 = R ≥0 (communication is never possible) then stability is lost regardless of the adopted control update policy. Recalling the definition of the set Ξ in (8), the assumption that follows provides a quite natural counterpart of Assumption 1 with respect to the DoS duration.
for all t, τ ∈ R ≥0 and t ≥ τ . In words, Assumption 2 expresses the property that, on average, the time instances over which communication is denied do not exceed a certain fraction of time, as specified by τ d ∈ R >1 .
C. Discussion
The considered assumptions only constrains the attacker action in time by posing limitations on the frequency of DoS and its duration. Such a characterization can capture many different scenarios, including trivial, periodic, random and protocol-aware jamming attacks [19] [20] [21] [22] . For the sake of simplicity, we limit out discussion to the case of radio frequency (RF) jammers, although similar considerations can be made with respect to spoofing-like threats [24] .
Consider for instance the case of constant jamming. Constant jamming is one of the most common threats that may occur in a wireless network [25] , [26] . By continuously emitting RF signals on the wireless medium, this type of jammer can lower the Packet Send Ratio (PSR) for transmitters employing carrier sensing as medium access policy as well as lower the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) by corrupting packets at the receiver. In general, the percentage of packet losses caused by this type of jammer depends on the Jamming-to-Signal Ratio and can be difficult to quantify as it depends, among many things, on the type of anti-jamming devices, the possibility to adapt the signal strength threshold for carrier sensing, and the interference signal power, which may vary with time. In fact, there are several provisions that can be taken in order to mitigate DoS attacks, including spreading techniques, high-pass filtering and encoding [21] , [22] . These provisions decrease the chance that a DoS attack will be successful, and, as such, limit in practice the frequency and duration of the time intervals over which communication is effectively denied. This scenario can be nicely described via Assumption 1and 2.
As another example, consider the case of reactive jamming [26] , [25] . By exploiting the knowledge of the 802.1i MAC layer protocols, a jammer may restrict the RF signal to the packet transmissions. The collision period need not be long since with many CRC error checks a single bit error can corrupt an entire frame. Accordingly, jamming takes the form of a (high-power) burst of noise, whose duration is determined by the length of the symbols to corrupt [21] , [27] . Also this case can be nicely accounted for via the considered assumptions.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In section III-A we introduce a modified consensus protocol to account for the presence DoS, and we present the main result of the paper. The proofs are reported in section III-B.
A. Modified Consensus Protocol
The consensus protocol in (3) needs to be modified in order to achieve robustness against DoS. In this respect, for every t such that the set S(θ, t) = {i ∈ I : θ i = 0} is not nonempty, the nominal discrete evolution is modified as follows:
In words, when a network node attempts to communicate and communication is denied, the control signal is set to zero until the subsequent attempt 1 .
To implement the consensus protocol nodes rely on their local clocks θ i . The jump times of each variable θ i naturally define a sequence of local switching times, which we denote by {t i k } k∈Z ≥0 . In particular, we have
The modified algorithm basically consists of a two-mode sampling logic. As it will become clear later on, this is in order to maximize the robustness of the consensus protocol against DoS. By (13), it is an easy matter to see that the sequences of local switching times {t i k } k∈Z ≥0 satisfy a "dwell time" property since
for every i ∈ I and k ≥ 0, where d max = max i∈I d i .
For the sake of clarity, the modified consensus protocol is summarized below. i polls j and collects the information x j (t) − x i (t); 8: end for 9: i computes ave i (t); 10: i computes θ i (t + ) as in (12); 11: i computes u i (t + ) as in (12); 12: else 13: if θ i (t) = 0 & t ∈ Ξ(0, t) then 14: i set u i (t + ) = 0; 15: i set θ i (t + ) = ε 4di ; 16: end if 17: end if
We are now in position to characterize the overall network behavior in the presence of DoS. In this respect, the analysis is subdivided into two main steps: i) we first prove that regardless of the DoS all the network nodes eventually stop to update their local controls; and ii) we then provide conditions on the DoS frequency and duration under which consensus, in the sense of (6), is preserved. This is achieved by resorting to a notion of Persistency-of-Communication (PoC), which stipulates that disruptions of the graph connectivity cannot exceed a prescribed threshold.
As for ii), the following result holds true. Proposition 1: (Convergence of the solutions) Let x(t) be the solution to (2) and (12) . Then, for every initial condition x(0), there exists a finite time T 1 such that u i (t) = 0 for all t > T 1 and i ∈ I.
By proposition 1, all the controls are set to zero after a finite time T 1 . Moreover, after T 1 each node tries to sample and transmit periodically with period ε 4di . If consensus, in the sense of (6), is not achieved this necessarily means that for some node i ∈ I all the communication attempts are destroyed. LetΞ
whereH n := {h n } ∪ [h n , h n + τ n + ∆ * [ By the above arguments, a sufficient condition under which communication is not persistently destroyed is that for any τ there exist a t such thatΘ(τ, t) has positive measure. This is because if the above property is true, then [τ, t[ contains a DoS-free interval of length grater than ∆ * , which is grater than ε 4di for every i ∈ I. The following result then holds. Proposition 2: (Persistency-of-Communication) Let x(t) be the solution to (2) and (12) . Consider any DoS sequence satisfying Assumption 1 and 2 with
and η and κ arbitrary. Then, for every τ , the setΘ(τ, t) has positive measure for any time t satisfying
Combining Proposition 1 and 2, the main result of this paper follows at once.
Theorem 2: Let x(t) be the solution to (2) and (12) . Consider any DoS sequence that satisfies Assumption 1 and 2 with τ f and τ d as in (17) and η and κ arbitrary. Then, for every initial condition, x(t) converges in finite time to a point x * belonging to the set E as in (6) .
Remark 1: Condition (17) in Proposition 2 amounts to requiring that the DoS signal does not destroy communication in a persistent way. This requirement is indeed reminiscent of Persistency-of-Excitation (PoE) conditions that are found in the literature on consensus under switching topologies, e.g., [17] . There are, however, noticeable differences. In the present case, the incidence matrix of the graph is a timevarying matrix satisfying: i) D(t) = 0 in the presence of DoS; and ii) D(t) = D in the absence of DoS, where D represents the incidence matrix related to the nominal graph configuration. Consider now a DoS pattern consisting of countable number of singletons, namely Ξ(0, t) = n∈Z ≥0 {h n }, with Λ n ≤ ∆ * . It is trivial to conclude that there exist constant δ ∈ R >0 and α ∈ R >0 such that (cf. [17] ) t0+δ t0 QD(t)D (t)Q dt = QDD Q δ > αI for all t 0 ∈ R ≥0 , where Q is a suitable projection matrix. However, in accordance with the previous discussion, consensus can be destroyed. The subtle, yet important, difference is due to the constraint on the frequency of the information exchange that is imposed by the network. In this sense, the notion of PoC naturally extends the PoE condition to digital networked settings by requiring that the graph connectivity be established over periods of time that are consistent with the constraints imposed by the communication medium.
B. Convergence Analysis
This section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let
where t ≥ 0. Consider the evolution ofV (t) along the solutions to (2) . Following the same steps as in [14] , it is easy to verify thaṫ
In words, the derivative of V decreases whenever, for some node i, two conditions are met: i) | ave i (t i k )| ≥ ε, which means that node i has not reached the consensus set; and ii) communication is possible.
From (19) we deduce that there must exist a finite time T 1 such that, for every node i and every k with t i k ≥ T 1 , either |ave i (t i k )| < ε or t i k ∈ Ξ(0, t). This is because, otherwise, the function V would become negative contradicting the fact that V is non-negative definite since L is the Laplacian graph. Thus the proof follows simply by recalling that in both the cases |ave i (t i k )| < ε and t i k ∈ Ξ(0, t) the control u i is set to zero.
Proof of Proposition 2 By definition ofΞ and in view of Assumption 1 and 2, the following bounds onΞ is readily obtained:
Finally notice that
Combining the two equations above, one sees that a sufficient condition for PoC is that t − τ > |Ξ(τ, t)|, which, in turn, is implied by
This is equivalent to
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof follows immediately by combining Proposition 1 and 2. In fact, by Proposition 1, all the local controls converge to zero in a finite time. In turn, Proposition 2 excludes the possibility that this is due to a persistence of the DoS status. This means that convergence to the set E is necessarily achieved.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In what follows we see a numerical example of the proposed consensus protocol in presence of DoS. A sustained DoS attack with variable period and duty cycle, generated randomly. The resulting DoS signal has an average duty cycle of 55%.
We assume completely connected undirected graph with n = 5 nodes. During times over which communication is possible each agent is connected to the other agents, namely d i = 4, while in presence of DoS graph becomes edgeless. A sample evolution of (2) and (12) with ε = 0.02 starting from the same initial condition and on the same graph is depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 . Initial conditions are generated randomly between 0 and 1. The vertical gray stripes in Fig. 1 represent the time-intervals over which DoS is active. The values of τ d and τ f for which consensus is not destroyed are plotted in Fig. 3 . Values above this curve satisfy inequality (17) with ∆ * = 0.0013.
Consistent with the results in [14] , [18] , the solution to (2) and (12) converges in finite time to a value close to averagemax min-consensus, namely 1 2 (min i x i (0) + max i x i (0)). Furthermore, one sees that the presence of DoS slows down convergence. This is due to controls remaining constantly to zero during the DoS status. The consensus time in Fig. 1 is almost twice the consensus time in Fig. 2 . (2) and (12), with ε = 0.02 (a complete graph with n = 5 nodes) in absence of DoS. under which consensus can be preserved. These results land themselves to many extensions. First, it is interesting to quantify the effect of DoS on convergence time. Second, it is important to investigate the case of partial communication failure, i.e. the case where DoS can affect the various network links separately.
